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This paper examines the pricing of statebank notes prior to 1860 using data on the discounts
on these notes as quoted in New York, Philadelphia, Cincinnati, and Cleveland. The study is
organized around determining whether these banknotes were priced consistent with their expected
net redemption value. It ﬁnds a bank’s notes had higher prices when it was redeeming it notes
for specie than when is was suspended. However, although prices generally varied inversely with
redemption costs, the relationship was not tight and persistent arbitrage opportunities existed.
∗I am indebted to participants at seminars at the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, the Central Bank
Institute at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, the University of Indiana, and the University of Kentucky
for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. The views expressed herein are those of the author
and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.The United States had only one bank when it won independence from Great Britain in
1786. This did not remain the situation for long, however. By 1800, close to 30 banks were in
existence, and over 250 more came into existence in the next twenty years. The rapid growth
in the number of banks continued over the next two decades, and by 1840 the country had
approximately 600 banks. Although the number of banks fell during the 1840s, there was a
huge expansion in the number of banks in the 1850s. The country had almost 1400 banks in
1860, just before the start of the Civil War.
Prior to 1863, the only way to get permission to operate a bank was to obtain a state
charter.1 Under these charters, banks were permitted to issue banknotes — dollar denominated
promises to pay specie to the bearer on demand.2 Notes were distinguishable by the issuing
bank, and virtually all banks issued them. Banknotes were almost always at least $1 in
denomination, and in many cases banks were restricted to issuing notes no smaller that $5.
To give these denominations some perspective, some typical prices in 1850 were ...
Banknotes circulated hand-to-hand and were the largest component of the currency
in circulation during the period. Consequently, throughout the antebellum period there were
large numbers of distinct currencies in circulation in the country.
There are two general facts about the rates at which these various currencies ex-
changed. First, even though all banknotes were denominated in dollars, the notes of diﬀerent
banks did not exchange with each other at par. Second, the exchange rates between the notes
1There were two exceptions: The (First) Bank of the United States, 1801-1811 and the (Second) Bank
of the United States, 1816 - 1836, which were chartered by the federal government. Although these banks
issued notes, I do not consider them in this paper.
2During this period, a dollar was deﬁned to be governmentally minted coin containing a speciﬁed amount
of silver (3xx. grains). Large denomination coins were made of gold and contained speciﬁed amounts of that
metal.of diﬀerent banks were not constant over time. These facts are known from contemporary
sources. Specialized publications listed the rates of discount or premium on the notes of banks
throughout the country in terms of notes of banks of some city, usually the location of the
publication. These “Bank Note Reporters and Counterfeit Detectors,” as they were generally
known because many also contained lists of known counterfeits, were usually published by or
in collaboration with a broker in a particular city.3 A l s o ,m a n yn e w s p a p e r sp u b l i s h e d“ B a n k
Note Tables” that contained similar information on note prices.
The existence of a large number of currencies circulating at ﬂoating exchange rates has
led many to conclude that the banking arrangements during this period were an impediment
to trade and economic growth. This was true of some contemporary observers. For example,
Senator John Sherman of Ohio used the following quote from the London Times in a speech
on February 10, 1863, to advocate passage of the National Currency Act:
By the want of a paper currency that would be taken in every State of the Union
at its nominal value the Americans have suﬀered severely. The diﬀerent States
were, as to their bank notes, so many foreign countries, each refusing the paper
of the others, except at continually varying rates of discount.... Only adepts and
regular money-changers could tell whether a note was current or not, the paper
of broken or suspended banks remaining in circulation long after their value had
departed. Through [a national currency] the people will ... gain that deliverance
from the previous confusion of their currency which to Europeans appeared a
barbarism.
3For an excellent discusion of Banknote Reporters and Counterfeit Detectors see Dillistin (1947).
2The same conclusion has been stated by some more recent writers. For example,
Phillip Cagan (1963) asserts:
The nation could not so easily have achieved its rapid industrial and commercial
expansion during the second half of the 19th century with the fragmented currency
system it had during the ﬁrst half....
These statements seemingly are based on the presumption that a uniform currency is
better than a nonuniform one.4 Theoretical support for a presumption in favor of a uniform
currency can be found in models like that of Ravikumar and Wallace (2000). In such mod-
els, currencies are ﬁat (intrinsically useless) objects used to overcome transactions frictions.
Nonuniformity of currencies is bad, because it limits the potential trades that can occur. An
implication is that the replacement of notes issued by state banks by notes issued by national
(federally chartered) banks, which for all intents and purposes were a uniform currency, was
a welfare improvement.5
Notes issued by state banks, however, were not ﬁat currencies. They gave the bearer
the option to exchange them for gold, which was valued in and of itself. As Wallace (2001) has
pointed out, if state bank notes are considered to be “payable-to-the-bearer securities [because
of this redemption option], then we might be more reluctant to accept the conclusion that
they should trade at par,”(p 2) and, as a consequence, to question the presumption that a
uniform banknote currency would have been a welfare improvement on the actual system.6
4By a uniform currency, I mean that units of distinct currencies with the same numerical designation
always trade at par with each other and buy the same quantity of goods at a given location at a given time.
5National bank notes came into existence with the passage of the National Currency Act (later called the
National Banking Act) in 1863. State banknotes continued to circulate until the passage of a 10 percent tax
on them levied in 1866 eﬀectively drove them out of circulation.
6Of course, such a ﬁnding does not imply that there might not have been other institutional changes with
regard to banking and transactions arrangements that would have been welfare improving during this period.
3The purpose of this paper is to determine the extent to which the behavior of the
prices of banknotes during the antebellum period is consistent with the view that they were
securities. It does so by developing some pricing implications of considering banknotes to be
securities and then examining the extent to which the data are consistent with view.
Following Gorton (1999), the paper takes the position that if banknotes are considered
to be securities, their price should equal their expected net redemption value — the expected
r a t ea tw h i c hn o t e sc a nb er e d e e m e df o rs p e c i el e s st h ec o s to fr e d e e m i n gn o t e sa tt h ei s s u i n g
bank. Although the actual pricing equation developed in this paper diﬀers from the Black-
Scholes banknote pricing equation obtained by Gorton (1999), the testable implications of
the analysis are similar.
The proposition that the price of banknotes should equal their expected net redemption
value has at least two implications that can be taken to the data. The ﬁrst is that prices
of banknotes should have moved with changes in expected gross redemption rates as, for
example, can be presumed to have occurred during periods when banks had suspended specie
payments on their notes. The second is that prices of banknotes should have reﬂected changes
in transportation costs since these should have aﬀected the cost of redeeming bank notes.
The paper ﬁnds two pieces of evidence consistent with the proposition. First, gross
redemption rates matter for the pricing of banknotes. The discounts on banknotes generally
are lower when banks are redeeming their notes in specie on demand than when banks have
temporarily suspended specie payments. Second, the cost of redeeming notes appears to
matter for the pricing of banknotes. The discounts on banknotes are positively correlated
with the cost of getting from the location where the banknote price is being quoted to the
location of the issuing bank.
4However, the paper also ﬁnds evidence that is inconsistent with the proposition. First,
the relationship between discounts and redemption costs is not tight. There are several cases
in which the discounts on notes of banks in several diﬀerent locations are the same even
though the cost of travel varies greatly. Further, there are several cases in the discounts on
the notes of banks in several diﬀerent locations vary greatly even though the cost of travel
to these locations is the same. In addition, changes in the discount on the notes of banks
in the same location do not systematically vary with changes in the cost of travel to that
location. Second, the paper ﬁnds that there are asymmetries in banknote prices in the sense
that prices quoted in location i for notes of banks in location j do not generally equal the
price quoted in location j for notes of banks in location i.
Thus, I conclude that statebank notes were not priced to equal their expected net
redemption value, so that the question of how the prices of state banknotes were determined
remains an open one. A richer theory is need to explain the prices of banknotes during this
period. Based on the empirical evidence presented here, I would argue that such a theory
should take into account not only the fact the suspension of specie payments aﬀected the
price of banknotes, but also the fact that notes of diﬀerent banks could have diﬀerent degrees
of acceptability in diﬀerent transactions. This richer theory is needed before one can answer
the question of whether a uniform currency would have been a welfare improvement on the
state banknote currency.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents an explicit formulation of
the proposition that the price of a banknote should equal its expected net redemption value
— the expected rate at which the note can be redeemed for specie less the cost of redeeming
the note at the issuing bank. Section two contains a description of the data on bank note
5prices used in this study. Section three shows that the gross redemption rates aﬀect prices
by comparing banknote prices in periods when specie payments are suspended with periods
when banks are redeeming notes for specie. Section four examines the relationship between
note prices and redemption costs. Section ﬁve demonstrates that there existed asymmetries
in banknote prices quotations depending on the location of the quote. Section six concludes.
1 .B a n k n o t e sa ss e c u r i t i e s
The proposition that banknotes were priced to equal their expected net redemption
value is obtained as follows. Consider what a local (location j) note broker earns by exchang-
ing notes of an arbitrary local bank for the notes of bank i. (It is convenient to think of bank
i as located elsewhere, but it could be another local bank.) After the exchange, the broker
ships the notes to the location of bank i and receives qt0(i) dollars of gold for each dollar of
bank i notes presented for redemption. The time subscript on this redemption rate is t0 not t
to account for the fact that what matters is the redemption rate when the note is presented
in the future, not the redemption rate when the broker buys the note. If bank i is redeeming
its notes in gold (the bank is not suspended) at t0,t h e nqt0(i)=1 . If it is suspended, then
qt0(i) ≤ 1. The broker then brings the gold back to the current location and exchanges it for
local bank notes at the rate of 1/qt00(j) local bank notes per dollar of gold. The time subscript
is t00 to account for the fact that what matters is the local redemption rate when the broker
gets the gold back to the home location. The broker must also pay the cost, δt(i,j) of taking
the notes to bank i and returning with the gold. I assume that this cost is proportional to
the size of the transaction and is known at t.T h u s ,i fEt expectation operator conditional






[1 − δt(i,j)] = pt(i,j) (1)
where pt(i,j) denotes the price of a dollar of the notes of bank i in terms of the notes of
banks in j at time t. The discount on the notes of bank i is dt(i,j)=1− pt(i,j).
2. Data
The data for this study are discounts or premiums on the notes of individual banks as
quoted in four locations — Philadelphia, New York, Cincinnati, and Cleveland. All data used
in this study are available at my website: http://minneapolisfed.org/research/economists/
wewproj.html.
There are bimonthly data for New York for the period July 1817 through December
1849 and monthly data for January 1850 through November 1852 from Shipping & commer-
cial list (and New-York price current). This source also has observations for October and
November 1853 and for July, August, and December 1856. Additionally, there are data for
November 1853, August 1854, December 1855, all months of 1857 except March, and June
1858 from Thompson’s Bank Note and Commercial Reporter (Thompson’s).7
The data for Philadelphia is monthly for the period August 1830 through January 1831
and August 1832 through December 1858. The data through January 1839 is from Bicknell’s
Reporter, Counterfeit Detector, and General Prices Current (Bicknell’s). The later data are
all from Van Court’s Counterfeit Detector and Bank Note List (Van Court’s).8
7Like Bicknell’s and Van Court’s, Thompson’s had several titles. See Dillistin for a discussion (pp 83 -
93).
8Actually, these publications had several diﬀerent titles during these periods. These diﬀerent titles are
discussed in Dillistin (1949). See p 126 for a discussion of Bicknell’s and pp 132-134 for a discussion of Van
Court’s.
7For Cincinnati, I have observations for February 1841 and for July 1845 through June
1847 from Goodman’s Western Counterfeit Detector and Bank Note Table, February 1850
from Lord’s Bradley & Co.’s Cincinnati Counterfeit Detector and Bank Note Reporter, and
July 1854 from Lord’s Detector and Bank Note Reporter.
I have three observations for Cleveland. They are January, June, and September 1856
from the Cleveland Bank Note Reporter published by Pierce &Co., bankers.
Discounts and premiums are quoted for banks throughout the country in terms of
notes of banks in the particular city where the bank note reporter is published. They are
not quotes for exchanges of bank notes for specie. When banks are redeeming their notes for
specie, this diﬀerence is not important. However, as shown below, it makes a diﬀerence when
banks have suspended specie payment on their notes.
The focus in the paper is the prices of notes of banks that are actually in business.
Consequently, quotes for the notes of banks that are “closed,” “winding up,” or “broken” are
not taken into account. After these the quotes for such banks are eliminated, I have over
200,000 individual banknote price observations covering over 2000 banks.
3. Bank note discounts during bank suspensions
The expectation term in (1) is the expected exchange rate of gold for notes of bank i
relative to the exchange rate of gold for local bank notes. When bank i and local banks are
expected to be redeeming their notes from t through t00,t h i st e r mi se q u a lt oo n es i n c en o t e s
in both locations are exchanging for gold at par. Then, from (1) and the deﬁnition of the
discount on a note
dt(i,j)=1− δt(i,j)=˜ dt(i,j). (2)
8The discount on the notes of bank i should be equal to the cost of redeeming its notes.
However, when bank i is expected to be suspended at t0, but local banks are expected
to continue to redeem their notes through t00; Et(qi
t0/q
j
t00) ≤ 1, because notes of bank i maybe
be going at a discount against specie where bank i is located. Then, from (2)
dt(i,j) ≥ ˜ dt(i,j).
Thus, if banknotes were priced equal to their expected net redemption value, the discount
on the notes of bank i should be at least as large when it is suspended than when it is not
during times when local banks are redeeming their notes.
Using the same logic, dt(i,j) ≤ ˜ dt(i,j) for the case in which bank i is expected to
redeem its notes at t0, but local banks are expected to be suspended through t00.T h u s , i f
banknotes are priced equal to their expected net redemption value, the discount on the notes
of bank i during times when it is redeeming its notes should be no larger when local banks
are suspended than when they are not.
During the period from May 1837 until the end of 1842 there are episodes when some
banks were suspended while other banks were not that can be used to test these predictions.
I am able to determine the dates of specie payment suspensions and resumptions for banks
in the cities of New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Charleston, Cincinnati, and New Orleans,
banks in the states of North Carolina and Kentucky, and for the Bank of Virginia during this
period. A summary of these dates is given in Table 1.
The table shows that there are two episodes when banks in New York are redeeming
their notes in specie, but banks in the other locations in the table are not: one from May 1838
to August of that year (or December in the case of New Orleans) and a second beginning in
9October 1839 and lasting until July 1840 in the case of Charleston and until various times in
1842 for banks in the other locations.
The discounts quoted in New York on the notes of banks in the other locations listed in
Table 1 are shown in Figures 1 through 8 for the period 1835 through 1844. (Throughout this
discussion, I will use the term foreign banks to designate the subset of banks in locations other
than that where the discount is being quoted.) Periods when foreign banks and New York
banks are redeeming are shown in thick dark gray; periods when foreign banks are suspended
and New York banks are redeeming are shown in black; and periods when foreign banks and
New York banks are suspended are shown in thin light gray. In dating the discounts, I assume
that the date of the discount is date of the publication in which it appears.
Testing whether the discounts in these ﬁgures are consistent with the banknotes-as-
securities view requires an estimate of ˜ dt(i,j) for banks in each location. For this I use the
average discount on the notes of banks in a particular location for the period between 1835
and 1840 when both the banks in that location and New York banks are redeeming their
notes. Obviously, this choice is somewhat arbitrary. My justiﬁcation is that it covers a long
enough period to insure that the results are not sensitive to a few outliers, but that the period
is short enough that changes in the cost of redeeming notes should not have changed very
much. It is also the case that extending the time period in either direction only makes the
evidence more consistent with the view that prices were determined by net redemption value.
My estimate of ˜ dt(i,j) for banks in each location is shown by the black dashed line in each
ﬁgure. For the data to be consistent with the prediction of the banknotes-as-securities view,
the discounts in black would always have to lie above this line.
10The evidence for all locations except New Orleans is consistent with banknotes priced
equal to expected net redemption value in the sense that the solid black line always lies
above the black dashed line. The strongest support comes from the discounts on the notes
of Philadelphia banks. Not only are the discounts on the notes of Philadelphia banks
in Philadelphia-banks-suspended-New York-banks-redeeming case always above the black
dashed line, but they are also always higher than at any time when banks in both places
are redeeming. This can be seen in Figure 1.
For banks in the other locations, excluding New Orleans, there some times when the
discounts on their notes in the foreign-banks-suspended-New-York-banks-redeeming case are
smaller than some of the discounts when banks in both places are redeeming. However, these
periods are few and short-lived. Further, the large discounts when banks in both places are
redeeming mostly occur immediately before times of bank suspensions, and it may not be
reasonable to assume Et[qt0(i)/qt00(j)] = 1 at such times. Hence, I conclude that the evidence
for banks in these locations also is consistent with banknotes priced equal to expected net
redemption value .
The evidence for New Orleans is less consistent with banknotes priced equal to ex-
pected net redemption value. There are two periods when New Orleans banks are suspended
and New York banks are redeeming, yet the discounts on the notes of New Orleans banks fall
below the black dashed line. These occur from October through December 1838 and from
October 1840 to early February 1841. Nonetheless, for New Orleans banks it is the case that
the vast majority of discounts when New Orleans banks are suspended but New York banks
are not are larger than when banks in both locations are redeeming.
11My conclusion is that, taken as a whole, the evidence from the discounts as quoted
in New York is consistent with what prices would be if banknotes were priced to equal their
expected net redemption value.
There is an interesting regularity that also appears in these ﬁgures. The discounts on
the notes of local banks always increase when banks in New York suspend payments regardless
of whether or not local banks suspend at the same time. The only case in which this does
not occur is for the Bank of Virginia.
As can be seen from Table 1, there are other episodes when banks in one location are
redeeming while banks in some other locations are not that can be used to test the predictions
of the banknotes-as-securities view. Speciﬁcally, during 1842 there is a time when banks in
Philadelphia have resumed redeeming their notes, but the Bank of Virginia, the Bank of
Louisiana, and banks in Kentucky and North Carolina continue to be suspended.
The discounts quoted in Philadelphia on the notes of the Bank of Virginia and the
Bank of Louisiana are shown in Figures 9 and 10 for the period 1839 through 1844.9 Iu s e
the same conventions for the lines in these ﬁgures as in Figures 1 through 8. The results are
very similar to those for the discounts as quoted in New York. Speciﬁcally, the discounts in
black (foreign bank suspended) always lie above the black dashed line (estimate of ˜ dt(i,j)).
Further, for the Bank of Virginia, the discounts on their notes are always at least as large in
the foreign-bank-suspended-Philadelphia-banks-redeeming case as when banks in both places
are redeeming. Thus, I conclude that this evidence on discount quotes from Philadelphia is
also consistent with banknotes priced equal to expected net redemption value.
9The discount data are for the Bank of Louisiana, not for all New Orleans banks since the Philadelphia dis-
count quotations for New Orleans banks diﬀer by bank. This was not true for New York discount quotations.
There the discounts were listed simply for all New Orleans banks.[check wording this source]
12The evidence presented above is all cases when foreign banks are suspended and lo-
cal banks are redeeming versus discounts when both are redeeming. The fact that I have
quotations from Philadelphia permits tests for the opposite case, because there are periods
when Philadelphia banks are suspended but banks in some other locations are not. As noted
above, if banknotes are priced equal to expected net redemption value, the discounts on notes
of redeeming foreign banks should be no larger during these times than during times when
Philadelphia banks are also redeeming their notes.
There are three episodes that I consider. The ﬁrst two are the times when Philadelphia
banks were suspended but New York banks were not. These are the same episodes considered
in the discussion of discount quotes from New York, but I now consider it from the point of
view of discounts quoted in Philadelphia. The discounts on the notes of New York banks as
quoted in Philadelphia for this period is shown in Figure 11, and these are consistent with the
prediction of the theory since they are never larger when during periods when Philadelphia
banks are suspended than when they are redeeming. In fact, the ﬁgure shows that during
the second suspension by Philadelphia banks, notes of New York banks were commanding a
substantial premium in Philadelphia.
The third episode is that beginning in July 1840 when Charleston banks resumed
specie payments, but Philadelphia banks did not until March 1842. The discounts the notes
of Charleston banks as quoted in Philadelphia for 1839 - 1844 are shown in Figure 12. The
evidence here is less favorable to the banknotes-as-securities view than that in Figure 11, but
only slightly less so. Until January 1844, the discounts quoted in Philadelphia on the notes of
Charleston banks are never less than 1 percent when Philadelphia banks and Charleston banks
are both redeeming their notes in specie. However, when Philadelphia banks are suspended
13and Charleston banks are redeeming, the discount is 1 percent or less except for March and
April 1841.
Taken altogether, I conclude that the evidence from the periods when banks in one
location are redeeming whereas banks in another location are not is consistent with the
banknotes-as-securities view of how banknotes were priced during the antebellum period.
4. Bank note discounts and redemption costs
If banknotes are priced to equal to expected net redemption value, then (1) predicts
that the discount on a bank’s notes should be positively related to the cost of redeeming its
notes, δt(i,j). I now test this prediction in two ways. The ﬁrst is by considering a cross section
of banks with diﬀerent redemption costs at a point in time when all banks can reasonably be
expected to be redeeming their notes The second is by examining whether known changes in
redemption costs over time aﬀect the discount on a bank’s notes. The evidence I examine is
always from periods during which all banks could reasonably be expected to be redeeming
their notes. In other words, I assume that Et(qi
t0/q
j
t00)=1for all i,j during the time periods
used to test this prediction. By limiting the examination to such period, there are no issues
about expected diﬀerences in gross redemption values aﬀecting the discounts of diﬀerent
banks.
A. Cross sectional evidence
I ﬁrst consider the case in which the notes of bank k are more costly to redeem in
location j than are the notes of bank i; δt(i,j) <δ t(k,j). When this is the case, the banknotes-
as-securities view predicts that dt(i,j) <d t(k,j), the discount of the notes of bank i should
be lower than the discount on the notes of bank k. It is this prediction that I test in this
14section. I do so by considering cross sections of banks at several times.
To select locations of banks with which to test this prediction, I examined Disturnell’s
Guide through the Middle, Northern, and Eastern States for 1847 and Disturnell’s Railway
and Steamship Guide for 1854 and 1855 (I will refer to all three as Disturnell’s)t oﬁnd cities
for which I could obtain information on the cost or distance of traveling to them from New
York and from Philadelphia.
Then, I eliminated from this list those cities in which banks had some type of special
note redemption arrangements that would have aﬀected the discounts on their notes. Specif-
ically, I eliminated all cities in New England expect Boston, because of the presence of the
Suﬀolk Banking System, a note clearing arrangement that virtually all New England banks
participated in during this period. While this System was in place, the notes of all New Eng-
land banks went at par in that region, which meant that all banknotes in that region were
quoted at the same rate of discount. I also eliminated all cities in the state of New York except
Albany. After 184x, every New York bank was required to have an agent bank in either New
York or Albany that would redeem its notes at no greater than a xx percent discount. I also
eliminated virtually all cities in New Jersey because they had par redemption arrangements
with banks in either New York or Philadelphia, and I eliminated all cities in Delaware and
several cities near Philadelphia because they had par redemption arrangements with banks
in that city. Finally, I eliminated all cities in Ohio except Cincinnati and Cleveland because
xxx. In the end, I was left with a sample of 32 cities.
There is travel cost information in Disturnell’s for travel from New York or Philadelphia
to many of these cities. This information is the price of a ticket to get from either of these
locations (a one way fare) to a city in the sample. By 1854, this is the price of a railroad
15ticket in most case. However, there are cases, including that of getting from Philadelphia to
New York, in which a steamboat or ferry trip was also involved. Further, getting to Mobile
and New Orleans involved taking a stagecoach at least part of the way. Cost information by
city is given in the Appendix.
Discounts quoted in New York are plotted against cost in Figures 13 and 14 for 1847
and 1854, respectively. Discounts quoted in Philadelphia in Figures 15 and 16 for the same
years.10 As the ﬁgures show, in all four cases discounts increase with redemption costs
consistent with banknotes being priced to equal expected net redemption value. However,
the ﬁgures reveal several cases in which there are large diﬀerences in costs with little or no
diﬀerence in discounts. In 1847 the cost of getting from New York to Richmond is $14, the
cost of getting to Mobile is $64, and the cost of getting to New Orleans is $69. Yet the notes of
banks in all three locations had an average quoted discount during that year of approximately
1.1 percent. For Philadelphia for the same year, the cost of getting to Charleston was $25
and the cost of getting to New Orleans was $66. Yet, the notes of banks in both locations
had the same average quoted discount (1.06 percent) during that year.
The ﬁgures for 1854 show even more extreme cases in which there are large diﬀerences
in costs with little or no diﬀerence in discounts. In 1854 it cost $11 to get from New York
to Pittsburgh, Richmond, Cumberland, and Cleveland. Yet the average annual quoted dis-









if α + β ln(δ
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t ) ≥ 0
otherwise
for j = New York or Phildelphia. The semi-log form was chosen because it ﬁt the data better than any
equation in the class (δ
ij
t )γ−1/(γ − 1). Consistent with the banknotes as securities vies, the estimates of β
are positively and statistically signiﬁcant in all four ﬁgures.
16counts on the notes of banks in these locations ranged from 0.75 percent (Cumberland and
Pittsburgh) to 2 percent (Cleveland). It cost $46.42 to get from New York to Mobile and
$51.42 to get to New Orleans. Yet the average annual discount on the notes of banks in these
locations was 2 percent, the same as Cleveland. Also, the average annual discount on the
notes of banks in Savannah was 1.25, the same as Richmond. Yet, it cost slight more that
$29 dollars to get to there from New York. The same types of diﬀerences also appear in the
discounts quoted in Philadelphia.
Unfortunately, I have only been able to ﬁnd cost of travel data for 1847 and 1854, and
it would be nice to see how discounts and redemption costs were related in other years. Since
distance and travel cost were highly correlated in 1847 and 1854, distance may be a good
proxy for travel costs during this period. Thus, I examined the relationship between bank
note discounts and distance for 1836 for both New York and Philadelphia and for 1827 for
New York, since discount quotes were not available in Philadelphia at the time. The reason
for the choice of these years was to have observations at roughly 10 year intervals, so that I
have one entry for each decade beginning with 1827. However, I chose 1836 instead of 1837
to avoid the panic beginning in May of that year discussed above.
The results are shown in Figures 17 and 18 for 1836 and in Figure 19 for 1827. The
results in these ﬁgures are consistent with those for the later years. Discounts on notes
generally increase with the distance of the issuing bank from the location in which the discount
is being quoted. However, there are also cases in which there are large diﬀerences in discounts
without there being large diﬀerences in distance. The exception here is the result for discounts
quoted in Philadelphia in 1836. Here the ﬁgure shows that there are no large outliers. The
relationship between discounts and distance is linear and very tight.
17B .C h a n g e si nr e d e m p t i o nc o s t s
I now consider the case in which the cost of redeeming the notes of bank i is smaller
at time t2 than at t1;t h a ti sδt1(i,j) >δ t2(i,j). Then (1) predicts that dt2(i,j) <d t1(i,j),
the discount of the notes of bank i should be lower at t2 than at t1. It is this prediction that
It e s ti nt h i ss e c t i o n .
An examination of Appendix Table 1, shows that there are 17 locations for which it
is possible to compare the cost of one way travel between those locations New York between
1847 and 1854. The cost of travel remained the same for 9 locations and fell for the other
8. For Philadelphia, the comparison is possible for 16 locations; travel cost fell in 8 and
r e m a i n e dt h es a m ei n8 . 11
The movement of discounts on the notes of banks in these locations as quoted in New
York and Philadelphia between 1847 and 1854 sorted by change in travel costs in reported in
Table 2. The cells shaded gray are those that are consistent with banknotes being priced equal
to their expected net redemption value. The results are not favorable to this proposition,
because the changes in discounts are essentially independent of the change in travel cost. In
Philadelphia, regardless of whether the cost of traveling to a location stayed the same or went
down or stayed the same, the discount on banknotes from that location were about as likely
to rise as to fall. In New York, when the cost of traveling to a location fell, again the discount
on banknotes such a location were as likely to fall as to rise. Only in the case when the cost
11An examination of Appendix Table 1 would seem to indicate that costs fell for more 9 locations in both
cities. However, the cost of getting from Philadelphia to Baltimore in 1847 is either $4 or $3 depending upon
the method of transportation. I chose $4 because it took less time. The cost was $3 in 1854. Since this
cost factored into the costs for several other cities, I regarded all of them as having the same cost in both
years. Assuming that the travel cost to these cities fell from 1847 to 1854 instead of being unchanged does
not change the overal results.
18of traveling to a location remained the same was the discount on notes more likely to remain
unchanged or to fall than to rise.
5. Price asymmetries
It seems reasonable to assume that during the period under consideration the cost of
going between two locations was the same regardless of which direction one is going. If so,
the cost of redeeming bank notes was symmetric across locations; that is, δt(i,j)=δt(j,i).
Now consider the time periods when it reasonably could be assumed that banks in both
locations were expected to be redeeming their notes. During such periods, Et[qt0(j)/qt00(i)] =
Et[qt0(i)/qt00(j)] = 1. Then if banknotes are priced to equal their expected net redemption
value, from (1), dt(i,j)=dt(j,i). The discount on banknotes should be symmetric; the
discount on the notes of bank i in location j s h o u l db et h es a m ea st h ed i s c o u n to nt h en o t e s
of bank j in location i.
Since I have banknote discount quotes from several locations, I can test this prediction.
Speciﬁcally, given my data, I am able to examine three possible cases to see if banknote dis-
counts are symmetric. Contrary to the prediction, I ﬁnd persistent, long-lasting asymmetries
in each of the three cases.
First, I compared the discount on the notes of Philadelphia banks in New York with
the discount on the notes of New York banks in Philadelphia for the period 1845 through
1856, a period during which banks in both locations were redeeming and for which I had
good data. The notes of Philadelphia banks were uniformly at a 1
4 p e r c e n td i s c o u n ti nN e w
York. In contrast, the notes of New York banks were never at a discount greater than 1/8
percent in Philadelphia and there were times when they were quoted at par.
19Second, I compared the discount on the notes of Cincinnati banks as quoted in
Philadelphia and as quoted in New York with the discount on the notes of New York and
Philadelphia banks as quoted in Cincinnati. I did this for each point in time that I had an
observation on quotes in Cincinnati. The notes of Cincinnati banks were always at discounts
of 1 percent or greater in New York and Philadelphia. However, the notes of New York and
Philadelphia banks were always quoted at par in Cincinnati.
Lastly, I did the same comparison for the discount on the notes of Cleveland banks as
quoted in New York and as quoted in Philadelphia with the discounts on the notes of New
York and Philadelphia banks as quoted in Cleveland. I only did this for 1856 since that is the
only time when I have discount quotes for Cleveland. I ﬁnd that the notes of Cleveland banks
were at a 1 percent discount in both New York and Philadelphia during that year. However,
as was the case for the quotes from Cincinnati, New York and Philadelphia banknotes were
quoted at par in Cleveland.
6. Conclusion
Prior to 1860 there were a large number of currencies circulating in the United States.
These were the notes issued by the numerous state chartered banks that existed during this
period. In general, these notes did not circulated at par against each other, and the exchange
rates among these various currencies varied over time.
This paper examines the determinants of the prices of the notes of the state-chartered
banks that were in existence during this period in terms of the notes of banks in New York,
Philadelphia, Cincinnati, and Cleveland. Speciﬁcally, the paper examines whether banknotes
were priced to equal their expected net redemption value.
20There are three major ﬁndings, one of which is consistent with this view about how
banknotes were priced and two which are not. The ﬁnding that is consistent with this view
is the expected gross redemption values aﬀected banknote prices. The price of the notes of a
bank was higher when it was redeeming its notes for specie on demand than when it was not.
The ﬁrst ﬁnding that is not consistent with banknotes being priced equal to net ex-
pected redemption value is the although the discounts on banknotes are positively correlated
with the cost of redeeming notes, this relationship is not tight. There several instances where
the discounts on banks in diﬀerent locations are the same even though the cost of redeeming
the notes is markedly diﬀerent. There are also several instances where the cost of redeeming
notes of banks in diﬀerent locations are roughly the same, but the discounts on their notes is
markedly diﬀerent. The second ﬁnding that is not consistent with this view is that the dis-
counts on banknotes are not symmetric. The location in which the discount is being quoted
matters.
My conclusion from the empirical evidence is that the hypothesis that banknotes were
priced to equal their net expected redemption value is not correct. Instead, to understand
how bank note prices were determined during this period, we need a richer theory.
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22Figure 1: Discounts on notes of Philadelphia banks

















both suspendedFigure 2: Discounts on notes of Baltimore banks

















both suspendedFigure 3: Discounts on notes of Charleston SC banks
















both suspendedFigure 4: Discounts on notes of Cincinnati banks



















both suspendedFigure 5: Discounts on notes of North Carolina banks

















both suspendedFigure 6: Discounts on notes of Kentucky banks

















both suspendedFigure 7: Discounts on notes of the Bank of Virginia

















both suspendedFigure 8: Discounts on notes of New  Orleans banks





















suspendedFigure 9: Discounts on notes of the Bank of Virginia

















both suspendedFigure 10: Discounts on notes of the Bank of Louisiana


















both suspendedFigure 11: Discounts on notes of New York banks
















both suspendedFigure 12: Discounts on notes of Charleston SC banks

















both suspendedFigure 13: Discounts on banknotes in New York













tFigure 14: Discounts on banknotes in New York












tFigure 15: Discounts on banknotes in Philadelphia












tFigure 16: Discounts on banknotes in Philadelphia













tFigure 17: Discounts on banknotes in New York














tFigure 18: Discounts on banknotes in Philadelphia




















New York 10-May 10-May
Philadelphia 11-May 13-Aug 9-Oct 17-Mar **
Baltimore 11-May 13-Aug 10-Oct 18-Mar **
Charleston 17-May 1-Sep 14-Oct 21-Jul
Cincinnati 17-May 13-Aug 14-Oct 18-Feb
North Carolina 18-May 1-Aug 9-Oct June
Kentucky 19-May 13-Aug 16-Oct June
Bank of Virginia 15-May 13-Aug 12-Oct 15-Sep **
New Orleans 13-May * 24-Dec 18-Oct 5-Dec
* six banks ** brief resumption





Table 1: Dates of bank suspensions and resumptions by location, 1837 - 1842discount cost cost
smaller smaller same total
in 1854 4 3 7
no change 1 4 5
in 1847 4 1 5
in 1854 4 5 9
in 1847 4 3 7
Table 2: Comparison of travel costs and discounts,
 1854 with 1847
New York quotes
Philadelphia quotesLocation 1847 1854 1847 1854
Boston, MA 4.00 4.00 7.00 7.00
Albany, NY 2.50 5.50
New York, NY ----- ----- 3.00 3.00
Paterson, NJ 0.50 0.50 3.50 3.50
Harrisburg, PA 7.00 4.00
Philadelphia, PA 3.00 3.00 ----- -----
Pittsburgh, PA 11.00 8.00
Annapolis, MD 8.50 7.85 5.50 4.85
Baltimore, MD 7.00 6.00 4.00 3.00
Cumberland, MD 14.00 11.00 11.00 8.00
Ellicotts Mills, MD 7.38 6.50 4.38 3.50
Frederick, MD 8.85 8.15 5.85 5.15
Washington, DC 8.60 7.25 5.60 4.25
Richmond, VA 14.00 11.00 11.00 8.00
Wheeling, VA 18.00 14.50 15.00 11.50
Wilmington, NC 22.00 15.50 19.00 14.00
Charleston, SC 28.00 24.39 25.00 22.89
Savannah, GA 29.07 27.57
Augusta, GA 34.00 24.67 31.00 23.17
Cleveland, OH 11.00
Cincinnati, OH 15.00
Louisville, KY 18.00 17.25
Lexington, KY 21.00 20.25
Detroit, MI 21.00 12.50 12.00
Indianapolis, IN 17.00 15.25
Chicago, IL 18.50 18.00
St.Louis. MO 26.50 24.00
Mobile, AL 64.50 46.42 61.50 44.92
New Orleans, LA 69.50 51.42 66.50 49.92
New York Philadelphia
Appendix Table 1: Cost of  One Way Travel
 to Various Locations, 1847 and 1854
 from New York and Philadelphia